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The Proposed Uniform Estate
Tax Apportionment Act
In this Article the authors examine in detail the practical
implications of the new Uniform Estate Tax Apportion-
ment Act. While concluding that the act is not as yet in
completely acceptable form, they concede that insofar as
it might spur Congress to enact legislation comprehensively
dealing with the problem on the federal level, and serve
as a guide to future state attempts at apportionment legis-
lation, the act provides a point of departure toward an ade-
quate solution.
Eugene F. Scoles *
Richard B. Stephens"
THE classic prank of outfumbling a friend for the res-
taurant check has a grim counterpart in the area of state and fed-
eral death taxes. Dutch treat is not the invariable rule, and a bene-
ficiary may find that his supposed interest in the decedents estate
has been drastically reduced, or even eliminated, if he is required
to pick up the entire tax tab. The subject of this Article is that
area of the law that determines where the actual financial burden
of death taxes shall fall and, in particular, the proposed Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act.
Death taxes that are imposed upon the one who succeeds to prop-
erty upon the death of another, the familiar state inheritance
taxes,' raise no general apportionment problem although they may
present a question of proper allocation of the tax burden among
several persons who receive interests in the same property. - How-
ever, some states impose estate taxes3 or supplementary estate
taxes,4 and the federal death tax is an estate tax. Such taxes on the
transmission of property from the dead to the living, as opposed to
taxes on succession, are not self-apportioning. Under estate tax
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
** Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Illinois College of Law, 1958-1959.
1. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 375-403 (1957); Mhimi. STAT. § 291 (1957).
2. First Natl Bank v. Hart, 383 ]11. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1948).
3. E.g., FA. STAT. § 198 (1957).
4. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. oh. 120, § 408(a) (1957); Mxnm. STAT. § 291.34 (1957).
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statutes the question that arises is: Whose interest is to be dimin-
ished by the amount of tax that must be paid? This is the ques-
tion the proposed Uniform Act seeks to answer; but before the
need for such a statute can be considered or the proposed statute
can be appraised it is necessary to examine present rules of law
that bear on this question.
Rules concerning the apportionment of estate taxes emerge from
three sources: the Internal Revenue Code, will provisions, and
state statutes and judicial decisions. Each of these sources will be
explored briefly.
I. Tim PasFNr APPORTIONMENT RUuEs
(1.) Federal statute
The Internal Revenue Code does not, and probably cannot, es-
tablish rules for the apportionment of state estate taxes. As regards
the burden of the federal estate tax, the Code provides for appor-
tionment only in the case of tax attributable to two classes of
property: (a) proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life and
(b) property over which the decedent had a power of appoint-
ment.5
Insurance Proceeds. Section 2206' of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 provides that, in general, beneficiaries of insurance on the
decedent's life are required to contribute proportionately to the
payment of the federal estate tax, unless the decedent makes a
contrary direction in his will.
The contribution is required only with respect to insurance pro-
ceeds that form a part of the decedent's gross estate, which is a
realistic recognition of the proposition that the recipient should
not be called upon to bear any part of the tax burden if insurance
proceeds do not in fact affect the amount of the tax. Moreover,
the Treasury recognizes7 that statutory exemption of the proceeds
5. The discussion of these rules is adapted from the forthcoming book: STrlWILENS
& MAtt, FEiuEAL EsTATE AD GIFr TAXEs (1959).
6. Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the gross
estate on which tax has been paid consists of proceeds of policies of insurance
on the life of the decedent receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor,
the executor shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiary such portion of
the total tax paid as the proceeds of such policies bear to the sum of the taxable
estate and the amount of the exemption allowed in computing the taxable
estate, determined under section 2051. If there is more than one beneficiary,
the executor shall be entitled to recover from such beneficiaries in the same
ratio. In the case of such proceeds receivable by the surviving spouse of the
decedent for which a deduction is allowed under section 2056 (relating to
marital deduction), this section shall not apply to such proceeds except as to
the amount thereof in excess of the aggregate amount of the marital deductions
allowed under such section.
7. Letter Ruling, April 9, 1946, P-H FED. EsT. & GIFr TAx Sunv. ff 122-064
(1959).
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of National Service Life Insurance policies from the claims of
creditors" relieves the beneficiaries of such policies from contribu-
tion to the tax under this section, even though the proceeds of the
policies can be included in the gross estate in determining the
amount of the tax.
Subject to a qualification concerning proceeds passing to a sur-
viving spouse which is discussed below, if section 2206 applies, a
formula determines the amount of contribution that the executor
can exact from a beneficiary. He can collect an amount that bears
the same relation to the total tax paid as the proceeds included in
the gross estate and received by the beneficiary bear to the tax-




x total tax = beneficiary's share of tax
taxable estate
plus exemption
If there are several beneficiaries, the share of the tax burden for
each is determined with reference to his share of the proceeds.
Insurance proceeds passing to a surviving spouse are the subject
of a special rule that takes into account the marital deduction.
This is further statutory recognition of the proposition that if in-
surance proceeds do not in fact affect the amount of the tax the
recipient should not be called upon to bear any part of the tax
burden. The last sentence of section 2206 makes it clear that if
insurance proceeds that pass to the surviving spouse fully qualify
for the marital deduction, 0 the spouse is not required to contrib-
ute at all to the payment of the tax with respect to such insur-
ance.
A significant point here, however, is the manner in which it is
to be determined whether such proceeds qualify fully. Of course,
if a marital deduction for the proceeds is denied by the terminable
interest rule,'- the proceeds are taken into account in determining
the amount of the surviving spouse's contribution to the tax just
as if they passed to someone other than the surviving spouse. On
the other hand, if the proceeds meet the tests of the marital deduc-
8. 71 Stat. 122 (1957), 38 U.S.C. § 3001 (Supp. V 1958).
9. Probably, credits against the tax reduce "total tax" for this purpose. See United
States Trust Co. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643, 649 (D. Conn. 1939); In re Blumenthals
Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 148, 46 N.Y.S.2d 688, 692 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd per curiam,
47 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. CL 1944).
10. INT. RExv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
11. E.g., Eggleston v. Dudley, 154 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Pa. 1957), reM'd on other
grounds, 257 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1958).
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tion provision as regards the nature of the interest that passes to
the spouse, the question arises whether they are within the maxi-
mum marital deduction. To the extent that they exceed the maxi-
mum, they are again to be taken into account in determining the
spouse's contribution to the tax. But for the purpose of this fea-
ture of section 2206, the insurance proceeds can be viewed in iso-
lation. That is, insurance proceeds are treated as in excess of the
maximum marital deduction only if the proceeds alone exceed the
maximum; other property passing to the spouse, which might be
viewed as absorbing a part of the maximum, can be disregarded
for this purpose.12 In accordance with these principles, insurance
proceeds included in the gross estate and passing to a surviving
spouse in a way not to qualify for the marital deduction become
the "proceeds included in gross estate" in the above formula
for determining the spouse's contribution to the tax.
As indicated at the outset, a contrary provision in a will overrides
this contribution section. The statute has expressly recognized that
a contrary will provision is controlling only since 1942.13 But earlier,
in holding a particular will provision insufficient to overcome the
statutory prescription of contribution, one court at least indicated
that an explicit will provision against payment of any part of
the tax by the insurance beneficiary would prevail over the statute."'
Although the effect of a will provision is now settled by the
statute itself, the problem of the interrelationship of this section
and rules of local law remains. It has been held that section 2206
has the effect of imposing a duty on the executor to collect a part
of the tax from insurance beneficiaries when section 2206 authorizes
such collection.' Although section 2206 does not authorize such
collection in the face of a contrary will provision, the open question
is whether when the will is silent it authorizes such collection de-
spite a contrary rule of local law. The statute makes no express ex-
ception in such case. Although it has been long recognized that
section 2205 does not conflict with provisions of local law calling
for apportionment, the Supreme Court once intimated that it might
view differently the federal contribution rules on insurance and
power-of-appointment property which do not pass through the
hands of the executor. 6 Is a state statute or established principle
against apportionment in conflict with the federal statute and there-
fore invalid?
12. S. REP. No. 1018, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
13. Revenue Act of 1942, § 404(b), 56 Stat. 798, 945.
14. United States Trust Co. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643, 646 (D. Conn. 1939).
15. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918
(1951).
16. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 102 (1942).
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In one state, insurance proceeds passing to a surviving spouse
and qualifying for the full marital deduction have been subjected
to a part of the tax burden in accordance with the state's appor-
tionment statute.7 This might appear to be a recognition of the
proposition that a state apportionment statute is just as effective
as a will to override the contribution principles of section 9906. But
the case is not a square holding on the point The court said the
state and federal statutes were not in conflict because, as expressly
provided in section 2206, the contribution rule of that section
does not apply "to such proceeds except as to the amount thereof
in excess of the aggregate amount of the marital deductions al-
lowed."18 Under this view, it might take a will provision to free a
surviving spouse from contribution as regards insurance proceeds
that do not qualify for the marital deduction, but a state is free
by statute to make its own contribution rules on insurance pro-
ceeds that do qualify. This conclusion is at odds with the under-
lying policy of the federal apportionment provisions to free from
the tax burden interests that because of the marital deduction do
not contribute at all to the amount of the tax imposed. It may also
be at variance with the implication in the Supreme Court's opinion
in Riggs v. Del Drago'9 that with respect to two classes of non-
probate property Congress has occupied the apportionment field.20
Even though the language in question came into the statute after
the Riggs opinion was written, it is unlikely that Congress intended
less than full direction as to the nonprobate assets covered.
The contribution rules of section 2206 do not operate to restrict
governmental efforts to collect the tax;21 when applicable, they sim-
ply establish rights and obligations among the persons interested
in the estate.
Appointive Property. Section 22072 of the Internal Revenue
17. Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 198 Md. 59, 85 A.2d 50 (1951).
18. Id. at 554-55, 85 A.2d. at 57.
19. 317 U.S. 95, 99, 102 (1942).
20. See also Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH.
U.L.Q. 327, 330.
21. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2205-1, 20.2206-1 (1959).
22. Unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, if any part of the
gross estate on which the tax has been paid consists of the value of property
included in the gross estate under section 2041, the executor shall be entitled
to recover from the person receiving such property by reason of the exercise,
nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment such portion of the total
tax paid as the value of such property bears to the sum of the taxable estate
and the amount of the exemption allowed in computing the taxable estate,
determined under section 2052, or section 2106(a), as the case may be. If
there is more than one such person, the executor shall be entitled to recover
from such persons in the same ratio. In the case of such property received by
the surviving spouse of the decedent for which a deduction is allowed under
section 2056 (relating to marital deduction), this section shall not apply to
1959]
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Code of 1954 provides that, in general, one who has or receives
property over which the decedent had a power of appointment must
contribute to the payment of the tax if such property is included
in the decedent's gross estate. If the property is included, it is
immaterial whether the acquisition was by reason of the decedent's
exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment."3 Again,
however, a contrary provision in the will prevails.
The same basic formula is provided for determining the amount
of contribution that may be enforced as is provided with respect
to beneficiaries of insurance policies under section 2206. In other
words, the amount of the tax to be borne by one acquiring power-
of-appointment property is determined as follows:
amount of such property
in gross estate
x total tax = recipient's share of tax
taxable estate
plus exemption
If there are several persons acquiring appointive property, each
one bears a portion of the tax burden determined as above with
respect to the property received by him.24
As in the case of insurance proceeds, 25 this section also makes
special provision for property acquired by a surviving spouse;
again, the effect of the marital deduction is recognized. If the
property subject to a power of appointment and insurance pro-
ceeds includible in the gross estate and passing to the surviving
spouse in a manner that qualifies for the marital deduction are
within the amount of the maximum marital deduction,'2 such in-
terests passing to the spouse bear no part of the estate tax burden.
However, if such insurance proceeds and the appointive property
exceed in value the maximum marital deduction, the surviving
spouse does bear a part of the tax burden on appointive prop-
erty determined with regard to such excess. In other words, tak-
ing into account both section 2206 and section 2207, the maximum
marital deduction is utilized first to offset insurance proceeds and
then, to the extent not so utilized, to offset appointive property.
such property except as to the value thereof reduced by an amount equal
to the excess of the aggregate amount of the marital deductions allowed under
section 2056 over the amount of proceeds of insurance upon the life of the
decedent receivable by the surviving spouse for which proceeds a marital
deduction is allowed under such section.
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041 provides the rules for such inclusion.
24. Probably, credits against the tax reduce "total tax" for this purpose. See
United States Trust Co. v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643 (D. Conn. 1939); In re Bhit-
menthal's Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 143, 46 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd per
curiam, 47 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
25. See discussion at text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
26. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c).
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Any excess not so offset goes into the numerator of the fraction
set out above to determine the tax burden to be borne by the
surviving spouse.
Just as under the insurance section, it is clear that a will provi-
sion can overcome the apportionment or contribution rule for ap-
pointive property which otherwise is provided by this section.
Again, however, the effect of a contrary provision of local law is
uncertain; the problem here is the same in principle as that sug-
gested in the discussion of section 2206, above. Similarly, section
2207 does not operate to restrict governmental efforts to collect
the tax; 27 when applicable, it simply establishes rights and obliga-
tions among the persons interested in the estate.
Other Federal Provisions. Pursuant to the general scheme for
prompt collection, Congress requires the "executor" to pay the fed-
eral estate tax.28 The term executor is defined to include an ad-
ministrator and, in circumstances in which no qualified executor
or administrator is acting, "any person in actual or constructive
possession of any of the decedent's property.2 9 The obvious ob-
jective to facilitate and accelerate collection of the tax is affirmed
in section 2205 of the Code as follows: 3 0 "[1]t being the purpose and
intent of this chapter [the estate tax chapter] that so far as is
practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the de-
cedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its distribu-
tion." These provisions must be viewed only as an effort to estab-
lish a focal point for collection; to obviate the need to collect
fragmentary portions of the tax from beneficiaries of the estate,
and for collection purposes, to make immaterial the source or na-
ture of the fimds that are used for payment"3
Collection and payment of the tax are problems separate and
distinct from that of the ultimate internal rights and obligations
of the beneficiaries among themselves. The statutory language
from section 2205 quoted above, a part of a section that has aptly
27. Treas. Reg. § 20.2205-1 (1959).
28. INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 2002.
29. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2203.
30. INr. BrV. CODE oF 1954, § 2205. The section provides in full:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that part of
the estate passing to or in the possession of any other person other than the
executor in his capacity as such, such person shall be entitled to reimburse-
ment out of any part of the estate still undistributed or by a just and equitable
contribution by the persons whose interest in the estate of the decedent would
have been reduced if the tax had been paid before the distribution of the
estate or whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability for the payment
of taxes, debts, or other charges against the estate, it being the purpose and
intent of this chapter that so far as is practicable and unless otherwise directed
by the will of the decedent the tax shall be paid out of the estate before its
distribution.
31. See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a).
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been called "a challenging study in ambiguity,"8 2 seems to recog-
nize the estate tax as a general charge against the estate payable,
in the absence of specific provisions such as those relating to insur-
ance proceeds and appointive property, out of the residuary estate
or, if necessary, out of particular bequests in accordance with the
usual rules on abatement. However, the section clearly does not
fasten the burden of the tax upon the residuary legatee. This bur-
den is generally determined by state law. Consistent with this
view, section 2205 further provides that any rights to reimburse-
ment which arise out of the tax collecting process are enforceable
against the person who should bear the final burden of the tax. If
the internal allocation of the burden of the tax among the bene-
ficiaries is not properly made by the executor in accordance with
the applicable state law or the express federal provisions, bene-
ficiaries whose interests have been improperly diminished may be
entitled to reimbursement from the estate or from other bene-
ficiaries. While such possible rights to reimbursement are recog-
nized in section 2205, specific rights are not established by that
section in the way they are with respect to limited types of prop-
erty by sections 2206 and 2207. Thus, when those sections are in-
applicable, rules of law other than the federal provisions determine
the question of apportionment. But when such rights of reimburse-
ment exist by nonfederal law, they become enforceable by federal
law under section 2205.
(2.) Will Provisions
Congress leaves it up to the decedent to say by will, if he wishes,
what interests in the estate are to be diminished by the tax."
A decedent can specify, for example, that the entire tax is to be
paid out of property otherwise specifically bequeathed to a named
beneficiary, and, if the value of such beneficiary's interest is equal
to or greater than the amount of the tax, no interest other than
that of the named beneficiary will be reduced by payment of the
tax. In fact, in the case of such a will provision, if the tax were
actually paid out of the residuary estate and the specific legacy
were distributed intact to the named beneficiary, section 2205
recognizes that the residuary legatees would have a right to reim-
bursement from the specific legatee which right is enforceable as
a claim under a federal statute.
(3.) State Law
Early estate taxes were small as compared to self-apportioning
inheritance taxes. The tax upon the estate of a decedent was
32. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GiFr TAXATION § 18.54, at 775 (1942).
33. This is true even as regards interests otherwise subject to the special rules
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2206, 2207.
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originally viewed, like any other transfer tax or administration
expense, as a part of the cost of administration. By the time
estate taxes became appreciable, the common law rule had be-
come fairly well established that taxes upon the estate, as dis-
tinguished from inheritance taxes on the recipient, were payable
from the residue of the probate estate along with other adminis-
tration expenses.
As estate taxes became more significant, it became apparent
that when not anticipated the common law rule on payment could
cause substantial distortion of the testator's plans for distribution
of his property. Probably the greatest distortion under the com-
mon law rule occurs in cases in which nonprobate assets are in-
cluded in the estate for tax purposes; in such cases the residuary
legatees bear the entire burden of taxes imposed upon the estate,
including tax imposed with respect to the nonprobate transfers.
Many testators unwittingly provided for the members of their
immediate family by leaving them the residuary estate. As a con-
sequence, the burden of the unforeseen taxes often fell upon the
widow and children or other members nearest to the decedent.3 4
Dissatisfaction with the so-called common law rule placing the
burden of the federal estate tax upon the residuary was first re-
flected in legislation enacted in New York in 1930. The New York
Decedents' Estate Law, section 124, adopted a new policy ap-
proach to the allocation of estate taxes. Under this statute, the
burden of federal estate tax is "equitably prorated" among all of
the beneficiaries interested in the assets of the estate that were
subject to tax in an amount proportionate to their beneficial inter-
ests, unless the decedent otherwise directed. This provision for
equitable proration or apportionment of the federal estate tax
recognized that, if the decedent does not express his intention in
regard to an allocation of the tax burden, there is less chance of
distortion of his testamentary scheme if all beneficiaries equitably
share this burden.
Apparently agreeing with New York as to the preferable policy
in the absence of testamentary direction, several states adopted
statutes similar to the New York statute. 5 Since the Supreme
Court's decision in Riggs v. Del Drago in 1942, the trend toward
the adoption of apportionment by statute has accelerated.30 There
are now sixteen states that have statutes providing for apportion-
34. See DECEDFmrs" EsTATEs Comhi'N OF NEw Yonr, Comntmn RrPonr 838
(Reprint ed. 1930).
35. The states have not agreed on whether the statutory apportionment rule
should apply to all assets subject to tax or only to nonprobate assets. See Powell,
supra note 20, at 332.
36. Ibid. See also Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict
of Laws, 55 CoLum. L. Rv. 261, 263 (1955).
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ment of the federal estate tax to some extent, several such statutes
applying, for example, to nonprobate assets only.r Alabama, on
the other hand, has a statute providing that the tax shall not be
apportioned in the absence of testamentary direction,38 which may
very well be a legislative safeguard against the problem of retro-
activity, a common incident of judicial adoption of apportionment.
Two states, Maine and Florida, adopted 0 and then repealed 40
general apportionment statutes; the reason for such repeal is not
apparent.
Minnesota has never had a general apportionment statute. How-
ever, at one time a statutory provision 41 required apportionment
of the additional state estate tax, 2 which supplements the state
inheritance tax. The federal tax continued to be a charge against
the residuary estate,43 and it was pointed out that Minnesota was
"in the anomalous position of apportioning the state estate tax
among the beneficiaries but charging the residuary estate with the
entire federal tax." 44 The anomaly was removed in 1951 when
the apportionment rule was replaced by a flat prohibition against
apportionment of the state tax, unless directed by the decedent's
Will.
4 5
In addition to the statutory development in this area, several
states by judicial decision have espoused the apportionment prin-
ciple.46 Such decisions generally rest upon the equitable doctrine
37. ARK. STAT. § 63--150 (Supp. 1957) (adopted 1943); CAL. Pnon. CODE§§ 970-77 (Deering Supp. 1957); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2075-81 (1949); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2901-06 (1953) (adopted 1946); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81,§ 162 (1957) (adopted 1937, applicable to nonprobate assets only); Nal. Rzv.
STAT. § 77-2108 (Supp. 1955) (adopted 1949); Nay. REV. STAT. § 150.290 (1957)
(adopted 1955); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 88: 1-4 (1955) (adopted 1943; applicable
to nonprobate assets only); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 3A :25-31 (1953) (adopted 1950;
applicable to nonprobate assets only); N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 124 (adopted
1930); Oax. REV. STAT. § 113.050 (Supp. 1957) (adopted 1949; relating only to
surviving spouse's share); PA. STAT. ANN . tit. 20, § 881 (Purdon Supp. 1958)
(adopted 1937); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1956) (adopted 1943); TEX. REv.
Crv. STAT. art. 3683(a) (1952) (adopted 1947; applicable to surviving spouse's
share); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64-150 (1956) (adopted 1946).
In addition the following states apportion only state taxes: KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 79-1501(b) (1949); N.D. REv. CODE § 57-3723 (1943); R.I. GEN LAws ANN.
ch. 44, § 22-14 (1956).
38. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 449 (Supp. 1953) (adopted 1951).
39. Me. Laws 1945, ch. 269; Fla. Stat. § 734.041 (1955) (adopted 1949).
40. Me. Laws 1947, ch. 220; FLA. STAT. § 734.041 (1957).
41. MmNN. LAws 1931, ch. 332, § 7.
42. MNN. STAT. § 291.34 (1957).
43. In re Estate of Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949).
44. 34 MivN. L. REv. 704, 705 (1950).
45. MINN. STAT. § 291.40 (1957). A recent decision in the federal courts indi-
cates that in Minnesota a will provision may be effective to impose upon the re-
cipient of nonprobate assets liability for the federal estate tax. United States v.
Goodson, 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958).
46. E.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Walter, 306 Ky. 756, 207 S.W.2d 328 (1948);
McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952),
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that all participants in a fund should share the common expenses
of the fund. The result is that the states divide about equ y on
the question of apportionment. A bare majority have adopted by
statute or decision the doctrine apportioning in whole or in part
the federal estate tax among the beneficiaries of the estate. Of the
remaining states, a few have expressly adhered by judicial deci-
sion to the so-called common law approach;4 7 in others the cases
are unclear or the question has not been raised.48
This diversity of approach and the present-day mobility of the
American people, which creates multi-state factors in estates, es-
tablish the need for a uniform apportionment rule throughout the
United States. The need has long been recognized.4  Despite re-
peated suggestions that the best way to establish a uniform pre-
sumption in all of the states is by way of a provision in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, Congress has failed to act and the Internal
Revenue Service has not pressed for enactment of the needed
provision. In view of the need and of the failure of Congress to
act, this matter calls for uniform state action. It is therefore a par-
ticularly appropriate subject for consideration by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Whether
the proposed act is an adequate answer to the need can only be
appraised by a close study of its specific proposals.
II. ANALYSiS OF THE PioposEm Uqnwoami AcT
i August, 1958, after consideration in its committees over a
long period of time,50 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved and recommended for enact-
ment in all the states the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act.51
explained in Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954), cert.
denied, 849 U.S. 911 (1955), rehearing denied, 349 U.S. 948 (1955). The cases
are collected in Powell, supra note 20, at 334-35 n.14. See also Sutter, Apportion-
ment of the Federal Estate Tax in the Absence of Statute or an Expression of In-
tention, 51 Micm L. REv. 53 (1952).
47. E.g., First Natl Bank v. Hart, 383 Ml1. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943); In re
Estate of Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 842 (1949).
48. E.g., Central Trust Co. v. Burrows, 144 Ken. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936)
(rejecting apportionment under an interpretation of the federal statute later re-
pudiated by the Supreme Court in Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942));
Estate of Rosalie Calm Morrison, 24 T.C. 965, 969 (1955) (reflecting absence of
specific authority under Mississippi law). See generally Lauritzen, Apportionment of
Federal Estate Taxes, 1 TAx CouNsEL Q. 55, app. A, 96-135 (1957).
49. See PAun, op. cit. supra note 32, at 466; Calm, Local Law in Federal Taxa-
tion, 52 Y.L L.J. 799, 813 (1943); Scoles, supra note 36, at 309; Note, Proposal
for the Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 30 Ir,. L.J. 217 (1955).
50. HANDBOOK OF THE NATnoNAL CoNrumcE OF Co,.%LSsIoNES ON UU'-FOnx
STATE LAWS 133, 410, 413 (1952) [hereinafter referred to as HN-'Dioox followed
by distinguishing date]; HAIDuBoo 9, 287 (1953); HANDBOOK 87, 100, 247, 249
(1956); HANBOOK 88 (1957).
51. HAzmBoox 131, 132, 219, 221 (1958).
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The act was approved by the American Bar Association in the same
month. 52
The Commissioners have proposed a general apportionment stat-
ute. Preliminary question can be raised whether instead the act
should be limited in its application to nonprobate assets. Contro-
versy on this point alone may be an obstacle to wide adoption of
the proposed act. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the ensuing dis-
cussion the principle of general apportionment is accepted. A seria-
tim analysis of the sections of the act follows.
Section 1 (Definitions). This section defines terms used in the
act, and some of its provisions will be discussed in the course of
the discussion of the operative sections.
Section 2 (Apportionment). Under this section the financial bur-
den of state and federal death taxes is spread proportionately
among persons interested in a decedent's estate, unless there is a
contrary provision in the will. A desirable feature of this section
is that it adopts the same general method of apportionment as
that prescribed by the federal statutory provisions relating to in-
surance and appointive property which is one method of avoiding
conflict with federal provisions. The act provides a formula for de-
termining each person's part of the burden. The value of his
interest in the estate over the value of the interests of all persons
interested in the estate is the fraction to be applied to the total tax
to establish the portion of the tax to be charged against a person's
interest. This is the same approach that is taken under the state
statutes that are phrased to achieve "equitable" apportionment. '
Taking into account the definition provisions, it is clear that
there is to be included in determining the value of a person's in-
terest the value of property he is to receive or has received from
or by reason of the death of the decedent to the extent that such
property is included in the decedent's estate for the purpose of the
tax being apportioned. The act applies to both state and federal
taxes, but the last sentence of section 2 indicates that the amount
to consider in determining a person's interest is the value used in
computing the tax being apportioned. If both a state and a federal
tax are to be apportioned the computation for the two taxes may
differ because of different rules on includibility 54 or possible differ-
ences in valuation.
The status of interest and penalties on the tax is conveniently
52. 44 A.B.A.J. 1122 (1958). The proposed act is set out as an appendix to this
article.
53. E.g., N.Y. DEcED. EsT. LAw § 124; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 884 (Purdon
1956).
54. E.g., compare Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040, with MINN. STAT. §
291.01(3) (1957), and ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 375(5) (1957).
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clarified by the definition in section 1 of the "tax" that is to be
apportioned. Although there may be an exception as to method
under section 3, discussed below, interest and penalties are to be
apportioned as a part of the tax. This is consistent with Internal
Revenue Code sections55 that provide for collection of interest and
penalties "in the same manner as taxes" but which without the
express provision in the proposed act would leave room for argu-
ment that interest and penalties are not "tax," even though col-
lected as such, and not subject to apportionment
The treatment of interest and penalties was one of the uncertain
matters under the early New York statute,"" and such uncertainty
with its attending threat of litigation has been urged as a basis
for rejecting the doctrine of apportionment.Y The problem is not
confined to apportionment of the tax but extends also to accounting
between principal and income as to both receipts and expenses.
On the receipts side, the question is whether receipts from property
that is sold to pay interest or penalties are properly credited to in-
come or principal. On the expenses side, the question is whether
the payments themselves are properly charged against principal
or income. The Uniform Principal and Income Act does not ex-
pressly answer these questions, but they are answered in some
states by detailed statutory provisions"8 or by case law." The New
York apportionment statute treats interest as tax and as a charge
against principal.60 At the same time, in New York the income
earned during the period of administration by assets that are used
to pay debts and taxes is credited to the income beneficiaries."1
This seems inequitable and may be a circumstance in which under
section 3(b) of the proposed act, which has no counterpart in the
New York act, the court could vary the apportionment of interest
to treat it as a charge against income.0 2
The literal terms of section 2 of the proposed act and the com-
ments of the draftsmen on this section indicate that "the right to
55. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 6601(f), 6659.
56. See, e.g., In re Manville's Will, 102 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sur. CL 1950); Matter
of Reid, 193 Misc. 154, 79 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Surf. Ct 1948); In re Jamison's Will,
272 App. Div. 434, 71 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1947); In re Chamber's Estate,
54 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
57. Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 43 Iu.. L. RLEv. 153, 16,
169 (1948).
58. E.g., FL& STAT. § 733.01 (1957); iLT REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 163 (1957).
59. Proctor v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 98 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 Mass. 500, 165 N.E. 657 (1929); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Taylor, 53 I. 126, 163 Arl 734 (1933); see ScoTr, Tnusrs
§ 234.4 (2d ed. 1956).
60. N.Y. DEcE. EsTr. LAw § 124(3).
61. N.Y. PEas. Pnop. LAw § 17(b); cf. In re Harjes' Estate, 170 Misc. 431,
10 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
62. Presumably the equitable power under § 3(b) overrides § 6 as well as § 2.
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alter or omit apportionment, whether of property passing under a
will or inter vivos, [can] be exercised by will only." There are sev-
eral reasons why this is a controversial rule. It can be attacked on
policy grounds, and in some circumstances its application is un-
certain. Does it foreclose all inter vivos control over apportion-
ment? Does it prevent a transferor from giving an inter vivos donee
immediate assurances that he will never be called upon to share
the estate tax burden? Does it leave an inter vivos donee in a p osi-
tion where he may be subjected to more than a statutory share
of the burden of estate taxes? Does it affect apportionment of
the tax within a fund? These questions should be reviewed briefly.
First, it is difficult to find a policy reason against permitting the
settlor of a lifetime trust to condition his grant by the requirement
that all taxes on his estate be paid out of the trust fund to the ex-
tent that the fund is adequate. The provision would be unusual
but, for example, one transferring inter vivos a substantial share
of his estate to some of his children might wish to be sure that what
he kept would go intact to another child, perhaps an incompetent
for whom he was providing during his life.03 Under the proposed
act, it seems that such a provision would not be honored, for it
would be an attempt to alter the statutory apportionment rule other
than by will. Such a provision should probably be recognized. If
second thoughts prompted a reduction of the trust's share of the
tax and there were obstacles to direct alteration of the trust pro-
visions, the burden could be reduced indirectly by bequests to
the trust. In fact, a testamentary assumption of the tax burden
could well be construed as a bequest to the trust beneficiaries of
the amount of the assumed tax.
Second, no policy reason is discernible against permitting the
settlor of a lifetime trust to assure its beneficiaries that they will
not have to bear any part of the burden of taxes on his estate."
Suppose a person places property in trust reserving the right to
the income for ten years and giving the remainder to his son or
his son's estate. For that period the son does not know whether
he will receive the remainder intact or the remainder reduced by a
share of the estate tax, for the settlor's death within the ten year
period would leave the trust in the settlor's estate,0 5 and the pro-
63. Such a provision would not be uncommon in a pourover trust, transferring
substantially all the assets of the estate owner. A cautious draftsman would probably
include a provision authorizing the trustee to pay such estate taxes to avoid lltlga-
tion over power as well as the question whether a will provision could "reach"
the trust assets. See Fleming, supra note 57, at 167; cf. In re Harbord's Will, 197
Misc. 760, 95 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'd mem. 281 App. Div. 850, 119
N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
64. He cannot of course assure them against the possibility of statutory liens.
E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a).
65. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
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posed act would fasten part of the estate tax liability on the son
unless the settlores will, which can be changed until the time of
his death, provides otherwise. Should there not be a way to pro-
vide assurance against the tax burden if the settlor wishes to do so?
An agreement to provide in the will against liability might be
held unenforceable either for lack of consideration or possibly on
the ground that such a provision is contrary to policy expressed in
the act.66
Third, section 2 of the proposed act seems to give the testator
complete freedom in apportioning the estate tax by provision in
his will. The general provisions of the act place a proportionate share
of the burden on an inter vivos trust that is subjected to the tax.
No doubt this share of the burden can be reduced, directly or in-
directly, by a will provision. The question is whether it can be in-
creased or whether, for example, the testator can by will provide
for payment of the entire tax on his estate out of trust funds trans-
ferred during life but taxed at death. This may not be objection-
able if the trust was revocable until death by the testator. But
suppose it is subjected to tax only because the trust was created
in contemplation of death and within three years thereof. Perhaps
the statute can be supported against constitutional attack, if it
permits the will to increase the tax burden, on the ground that to
the extent of possible tax liability the inter vivos transfer is ren-
dered revocable by the act. But this is questionable as a matter of
policy, for it would make many seemingly complete transfers little
more than illusory until the transferor's death. Although some retro-
active application of an apportionment act to inter vivos trusts has
been sustained,67 the problem whether to give retrospective effect
to testamentary apportionment provisions seems quite different.s
66. In some cases involving inter vivos transfers under separation agreements,
the New York courts have recognized the enforceability of contract claims at
variance with will or statutory provisions on apportionment (without passing on
the question whether such obligations are subject to the same nonclain limitations
as are other inter vivos obligations). In re MeKeons Will, 4 Misc. 931, 124 N.Y.S.2d
590 (Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Brokaw's Estate, 180 Misc. 490, 41 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Surr.
Ct. 1943), aff'd mem. 267 App. Div. 811, 46 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct), affd per
curiam, 293 N.Y. 555, 59 N.E.2d 243 (1944). The inference is that such matters
are outside the scope of the apportionment act, and the contractual agreement has
been sustained even though the consideration for the promise was not such as to
preclude estate tax liability. See In re Brokaw's Estate, supra, particularly opinion of
Desmond, J., dissenting at 558, 59 N.E.2d at 245.
67. Cf. Security First Natl Bank v. Wellslager, 88 Cal. App. 2d 210, 198 P.2d
700 (1948); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 94 A.2d 703
(Sup. Ct. 1953); In re Mayer's Estate, 174 Misc. 917, 22 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Surr. Ct.
1940); In re Stanfield's Estate, 170 Misc. 447, 10 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd
per curiam, 257 App. Div. 932, 12 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But cf. Parlato
v. McCarthy, 136 Conn. 126, 69 A.2d 648 (1949).
68. A will direction was given retrospective recognition in United States v.
Goodson, 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958), to effect apportionment against nonpro-
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Finally, question may be raised whether section 2 affects in any
way division of the tax burden within a fund. Of course, as between
temporary and remainder interests no apportionment is to be made
under section 6, and the tax is to be a charge on the corpus. But
can the inter vivos transfer instrument validly alter the section 6
rule? Or can it specify the effect of the tax liability among the rc-
maindermen? It is difficult to see a policy reason against either
such alteration or specification, but either might be viewed as an
alteration of the statutory apportionment rule other than by will.
In the absence of a statute considerable uncertainty exists re-
garding the efficacy of a tax provision in an inter vivos transfer in-
strument. Such uncertainty could, and should, be replaced by posi-
tive statutory recognition of such provisions."' If the provision is
made, it cannot be done through inadvertence, and the principal
justification for special apportionment rules is to provide the sup-
posed best result for circumstances in which a property owner
has not dealt consciously with the problem.
In this light, the inclusion of a provision limiting alteration or
omission of apportionment to will provisions seems questionable at
best.
Section 3 (Procedure for Determining Apportionment). The basic
procedural rule, subsection (a), is that the probate court is to
determine apportionment as a part of the probate proceedings. 70
If there are no such proceedings, the probate court of the deced-
ent's domicile is authorized to determine apportionment upon ap-
plication of the person required to pay the tax.
Two problems are raised by section 3(a). In cases involving
ancillary administration: (1) what court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine apportionment? and (2) what law does the court apply? If
section 3(a) were interpreted as contemplating exclusive appor-
tionment jurisdiction in the state of the decedent's domicile and
bate assets. Query: Would such a provision be recognized under the proposed act
if it sought to shift the entire tax burden to such assets? Cf. Isaacson v. Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 (1950).
69. If this were done, the supremacy of conflicting directions could be deter-
mined by such a provision as the following from PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 883(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1958):
Powers of Testator or Settler. A testator, settlor, or possessor of any appro-
priate power of appointment may direct how the estate tax shall be appor-
tioned or allocated or grant a discretionary power to another so to direct. Any
such direction shall take precedence over the provisions of this act insofar as
the direction provides for the payment of the estate tax or any part thereof
from property, the disposition of which can be controlled by the instrument
containing the direction or delegating the power to another.
70. Reference in this section to the probate court that has jurisdiction over "the
administration of the estate" apparently overlooks the section 1 definition of "estate"
as the gross estate for tax purposes, which may include nonprobate property. This
could be cured by amending section 3 to read "the administration of the testate
or intestate portion of the estate."
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if all the forty-nine (or fifty) states enacted the proposed act,"
both questions could easily be answered. However, there is serious
doubt about both contingencies.
If this section is designed as a choice of law reference to the
domicile in all cases, such purpose is obscure. Moreover, if a con-
fict of laws rule referring to the domicle is intended, it is subject to
the many doubts raised in the cases and elsewhere7 2 as to the
power of a state to impose its rules upon transfers made outside
the state. These problems remain notwithstanding the desirability
of the single domicile reference.7 3 Consequently, a more explicit
treatment in the proposed act of the problem of governing law
would seem appropriate."
Under subsection (d), the apportionment determinations by the
probate court are only prima facie correct in subsequent litigation
to recover amounts from persons interested in the estate. This pro-
vision invites prolonged litigation by not going so far as it reason-
ably could in establishing finality. The last part of subsection (d)
should be amended to provide that the determination under (a):
shall be binding on all persons who are parties to the proceeding and
prima facie correct as to others.
With this change, the probate proceeding would render apportion-
ment res judicata when all persons interested in the estate were
properly before the probate court, and it is possible that persons
outside the state might submit to the jurisdiction of the probate
court in some cases.
It is difficult to see why the act should not go this far in seeking
finality. The comments of the draftsmen explain the prima facie
rule on constitutional grounds, indicating doubt as to the consti-
tutionality of a provision for binding apportionment that could
apply, for example, to a beneficiary of an inter vivos transfer who
was not before or subject to the jurisdiction of the court. The con-
stitutional questions are intricate and involve the due process,
equal protection, and full faith and credit questions of when a court
71. The act is also proposed for enactment in the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico. HANDBOOx 131 (1958).
72. Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958); First
Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 NAV.2d 524 (1954). These
matters are exhaustingly explored in Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate
Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55 CoLmi. L. REv. 261 (1955). See also Scoles,
Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9 U. F"A. L. REv. 398, 438 (1956); Ward,
Conflict of Laws and Estate Tax Apportionment, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 194 (1956).
73. Note that there may be federal control of the conflicts of laws questions
under at least one interpretation of Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); see
Scoles, supra note 72, 55 CoLum. L. REv. at 289.
74. Detailed statutory suggestions are included in Scoles, supra note 72, 55




can bind a person by a proceeding and when that court can apply
particular substantive law.75 But these objections can be met with-
out permitting apportionment to be relitigated in all cases. Even
if in the interest of seasonably terminating litigation a court might
interpret the statute as drafted to reach the result suggested, the
statute should go as far as possible in directing finality.
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 3 appear to deal more with
matters of substance than with procedure, providing special treat-
ment of interest and penalties. Although by definition in section 1
such exactions are part of the "tax" and therefore within the gen-
eral formula approach to apportionment under section 2, these sub-
sections inject equitable considerations into the apportionment of
interest and penalties. Under (b) "special circumstances" may au-
thorize an "equitable" apportionment of such items. It appears this
language is not intended to apply to the personal representative
because under (c) the court may charge such items to the fiduciary
if they are attributable to "delay caused by the negligence of the
fiduciary." Adoption of an equitable approach to this problem is
surely desirable. We are concerned here with charges that are
avoidable, which should fall on the one who is responsible for
them or who benefits from the delay causing them. Illustrative
problems indicating the need for the flexibility provided by sub-
section (b) have been presented earlier in this Article.71 Conse-
quently, attention here will be focused on subsection (c).
There is a technical objection to subsection (c). Why is possible
liability of a fiduciary 77 limited to instances in which penalties or
interest are due to "delay caused by ... negligence"? If an execu-
tor embezzled estate funds and filed a fraudulent return, interest
on tax ultimately found due would be caused by delay in paying
the tax, but a heavy fraud penalty would arise out of the executor's
evasive conduct, not delay, and his action would be intentional,
not negligent. Perhaps the statute would be interpreted in such a
way as to charge him with such a penalty. However, it would seem
better to let executor liability rest on "special circumstances" and
and "equitable" principles as does beneficiary liability under sub-
section (b). Fiduciaries probably would like, and may be entitled
to, more explicit assurance against personal liability than what
75. Cf. Warfield v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 147 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 1958); Isaacson v.
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334 (1950); First
Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954); In ro
Buckman's Will, 270 App. Div. 707, 62 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mom. 290
N.Y. 915, 73 N.E.2d 37, cert. denied sub norn. Kay v. MaeCormack, 332 U.S. 703
(1947); In re Cronise's Estate, 167 Misc. 310, 6 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Surr. Ct. 1937);
Scoles, supra note 72, 55 CoLum. L. REv. at 293.
76. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
77. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2203, a person "in actual or constnctivo
possession of any property of the decedent" is the statutory executor, charged with
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they would have under equitable principles. If the statute gives
them such assurance by the separate rules of subsection (b) and
(c), subsection (c) should at least not restrict their accountability
to instances of delay caused by negligence. But, in any event, view-
ing the question from the perspective of the general powers of the
courts over fiduciaries, the flexible rule of subsection (b) seems
suitable. Of course, the executor may be relieved of liability for
negligence in the administration of the estate by an exculpatory
clause in the will. While it is uncertain that such a clause would
be accepted as a direction against apportionment, it should at least
be taken into account in the exercise of the court's discretion undei
subsection (c) as drafted or in determining equitable apportion-
ment if the fiduciary's liability were made to rest on the more gen-
eral language of subsection (b).
Section 4 (Methods of Proration). The provisions of this section
set out the means by which apportionment is to be made effective.
Three circumstances are recognized. First, one in possession of the
decedents property who is required to pay the tax may 'withhold
from amounts distributed to persons interested in the estate the
amount of tax ascribed to their interests. Second, if the property
distributable to any such person does not equal that person's share
of the tax (as might be the case for example, where the person
received a specific bequest of $5000 but was also the donee of a
$50,000 gift in contemplation of the decedents death), the one
required to pay the tax may retain the property in his possession
and recover from the person interested in the estate the balance of
his share of the tax. Third, if the one required to pay the tax is
not in possession of any property distributable to a beneficiary to
whom part of the-tax is apportioned (as might be true, for ex-
ample, if a contemplation of death donee was entitled to receive
nothing from the probate of the estate), he may recover from such
person the full amount of the tax ascribed to that person's interest.
Subsection (b) seeks to assure ultimate collection from bene-
ficiaries by permitting the fiduciary, subject to judicial approval,
to require a beneficiary to post bond for his anticipated tax liabil-
ity if the fiduciary is to make distribution of any property to him
prior to final apportionment of the tax.
These provisions are clear, forthright and not subject to ques-
tion. Properly interpreted they encompass the problems of enforced
contribution for both the original tax and deficiencies.-8 It may be
the responsibility of filing returns and paring the tax, if no executor or administra-
tor is "appointed, qualified, and acting.' Presumably, the definition of "fiduciary"
in the apportionment act is sufficiently broad to include such unusual situations.
78. The deficiencies point is covered by the third rule discussed above, for any
amount required to be paid as a deficiency, including interest and penalties, is an
amount paid as tax.
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desirable to add an additional provision concerning refunds. Such
a rule, expressing a reverse apportionment principle, should pro-
vide expressly that persons whose interests have been diminished
by tax have a pro rata right to recover a part of the refund, includ-
ing any interest, from the one to whom it was paid.
Section 5 (Allowance for Exemptions, Deductions and Credits).
Here we find statutory recognition of the need for adjustment in
some circumstances of the formula for apportionment provided in
section 2. The general rule expressed in subsection (a is that al-
lowances shall be made for exemptions, deductions and credits;
the remaining subsections indicate the manner in which such allow-
ances are to be made.
Subsection (b) applies to the charitable deduction and marital
deduction 79 allowed in determining the taxable estate for federal
estate tax purposes (and any similar state exemption or deduction).
The statute provides that such deductions "shall inure to the bene-
fit of" the surviving spouse or charity as the case may be. The
theory, of course, as mentioned above in the discussion of the fed-
eral apportionment provisions, is that since such deductible inter-
ests do not contribute to the tax, those receiving them should not
be called upon to bear a part of the tax burden. This reasoning
may be subject to question80 but is generally accepted.
The phrase "shall inure to the benefit of" is more general than
it need be."' The statute could be more forthrightly drawn to pro-
vide:
for the purpose of apportionment under section 2, the amount of such
exemption or deduction shall reduce the interest of the person bearing
such relationship or receiving such gift.8 2
It is worth noting that, in any event, the allowance made here
will often simplify the computation of the tax when apportionment
is in effect. Without this provision the share of a surviving spouse
would always be diminished by a ratable part of the tax. The fed-
eral statute requires such reductions to be taken into account in
determining the value of the interests passing to the spouse for
the purpose of the marital deduction. 3 Thus, the tax attributable
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2055, 2056, respectively.
80. Lauritzen, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 1 TA.x COUNSEL. Q. 55,
85 (1957).
81. It might be argued that this language could be interpreted to mean that
the tax should be figured with and without the deduction and the difference should
be the reduction in the liability of the surviving spouse or charity, as the case
may be. This is clearly not intended and should not seriously be entertained by a
court.
82. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 884(b) (Purdon Supp. 1958), which pro-
vides: "Any interests for which deduction is allowable . . . in determining the . . .
net estate . . . shall not be included in the computation .... ; INT. Riv. CODE or
1954, §§ 2206, 2207 discussed above.
88. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(4)(a).
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to her interest might reduce the interest passing to her below the
maximum marital deduction, and this creates an algebraic problem
involving "two mutually dependent variables," 84 the amount of
the marital deduction and the amount of the tax. Subsection (b)
forecloses this problem by, in effect, relieving the surviving spouse's
share from the burden to the extent that it qualifies for the marital
deduction. Like reasoning applies to bequests to charity.
An exception to the allowance just described is made by the last
clause of subsection (b). This clause provides that, if an exempt or
deductible interest is subject to a prior present interest that is not
exempt or deductible, the tax charged against such prior interest
is to be paid from principal. For example, if a decedent left prop-
erty in trust with the income to be paid to his mother for life and
remainder to his wife or the wife's estate, the value of the wife's
remainder would, subject to the maximum limitation, qualify for
the marital deduction."5 The mother's interest would of course not
be deductible. Under the exception being considered, the tax at-
tributable to the mother's interest would be a charge on the trust
principal and thus reduce the amount qualifying for the marital
deduction.' The desirability of this exception to the allowance of
deductions is debatable, although it may be difficult to avoid. The
exception presents a problem of computation of the estate tax
similar to one dealt with in subsection (e), and it may be ques-
tionable also as regards the general fairness of the apportionment
plan. From the tax aspect, the algebraic problem of computation
mentioned above rears its ugly head. If the tax is a charge on prin-
cipal, the value of the wife's remainder interest is reduced accord-
ingly. In any situation in which the property passing to her was
not substantially in excess of the maximum marital deduction, such
a reduction in the value of her remainder interest will reduce the
marital deduction and increase the tax. But the tax itself is de-
pendent upon the amount of the deduction. Thus, when by reason
of this provision the entire tax is charged to the principal, the tax
affects the value of the remainder interest given to the surviving
spouse, and the usual simplification resulting from the allowance
made for deductions is lost.
Moreover, the question arises whether it is fair in effect to bur-
den the wife's deductible interest with tax on a prior nondeducti-
ble interest. Of course considerations of fairness in this context
must take into account the decedent's opportunity to make what-
ever arrangements he wishes by provision in his will. But the gen-
84. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 481 (1948).
85. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-4(d) (1959).
86. In a slightly different context this rule, charging the principal with the
entire tax, is expressed in section 6, discussed below.
1959]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
eral policy of the statute is to free deductible interests from the
tax burden. The exception is at variance with that policy. The
draftsmen's comments on a cognate rule in section 6 indicate that,
despite a feeling of unfairness, particularly where a deductible
charitable interest follows a prior interest, they could see "no prac-
tical way to work the matter out." There are ways to work the mat-
ter out, and it is a matter of judgment whether any are practical.
Provision could be made to amortize the tax allocable to the
temporary interest over the estimated or prescribed duration of
such interest. Such an approach might be feasible in some trusts,
but the complications that would be presented by non-income-pro-
ducing property or by legal life estates tend to support the Com-
missioners' conclusions of impracticability. Of course, amortiza-
tion difficulties must be weighed against other factors. If an amorti-
zation device avoids the reduction in the value of the deductible
interest, the inherent unfairness of the proposed rule, the tax in-
crease, and the computation complexities are all eliminated. Even
if upon an early termination of the nondeductible interest the un-
amortized portion of the tax burden fell upon the deductible inter-
est, the tax advantage should not be lost. For example, in the case
of a vested remainder in a surviving spouse following a nondeduc-
tible life interest, the see-saw effect of a premature death of the life
tenant would result in an enhancement in the value of the spouse's
interest over its assumed date of death value, which should offset
the diminution occasioned by the unamortized tax burden.
Perhaps the complications possible in many cases preclude a
general statutory provision either imposing the tax burden on the
temporary interest or amortizing it. However, in an appropriate
case the estate owner's draftsman should consider incorporating
one of these two approaches in a testamentary direction.87 The
fact that the proposed act permits this lends further support to the
Commissioners' conclusions.
Subsection (e) of section 5 which the draftsmen tag "the most
controversial part of the Act," should be considered here. It is de-
signed to avoid the intricate algebraic tax computation problem
mentioned previously in a situation somewhat similar to that cre-
ated by the exception to subsection (b) which was just discussed.
If a state inheritance or other death tax falls upon and is payable
from an interest passing to a surviving spouse or a charity, the
available federal estate tax deduction is correspondingly reduced.
If such a reduction in the otherwise allowable federal deduction
increases the federal tax, should a part of the federal tax be ascribed
87. A third possibility, that of giving the executor discretion in this respect
seems to present a greater question regarding the effect on the computation of the
marital deduction. Cf. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-4(c), (d) (1959).
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to such interests? Although to do so would seem superficially to be
an equitable rule, the statutory answer is no. Subsection (e) pro-
vides that where the federal deduction is disallowed solely by
reason of, and to the extent of, the state tax, no apportionment
shall be made against this interest. If the interest, for example,
passing to a surviving spouse would be fully deductible for federal
estate tax purposes except for the amount of the state tax imposed
upon and payable from her interest, no part of the federal tax is to
be apportioned to her interest Even if seemingly inequitable, the
rule may be desirable, because the net effect is that the marital
deduction can be determined without regard to the amount of the
federal tax (and the same would be true of the charitable deduc-
tion in similar circumstances), and the need for nice algebraic com-
putations is avoided. This provision, if properly understood, should
not be controversial; it is desirable as avoiding confusion and pos-
sible resulting litigation.
Nevertheless, in answering one problem this provision creates
another. The second sentence of subsection (e) is an attempt to
preserve the estate's right to elect a deduction for state tax on chari-
table transfers, rather than merely treating such tax as entering
into the computation of the credit for state death taxes. A rather
recent amendment to the Code"8 provides this election, but it can
be made in the first instance only if "the decrease in tax... which
results from the deduction... will inure solely for the benefit of
[qualified] public, charitable or religious transferees." Under the
basic apportionment rule and the allowance to be made under sub-
section (b), the tax is not to be apportioned against a deductible
charitable bequest. On the other hand, a part of the tax would
be apportioned against such a bequest to the extent that it was
nondeductible because of state taxes imposed upon it,89 except
for the provision of subsection (e). Can these provisions foreclose
the deduction? The draftsmen expressed difficulty in seeing "how
this could happen" but grudgingly included a precautionary pro-
vision at the urging of representatives of the Tax Section of the
American Bar Association. The Tax Section was right.
Section 2058(d), providing the election to deduct state taxes
on charitable bequests, at first limits the election to instances in
which tax reduction arising out of the deduction will benefit only
the charity, as explained above. Under (b) and (e) of section 5
of the proposed act, no benefit could actually redound to the char-
ity because it is relieved of liability for all estate tax, including that
88. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 2058(d), 2011(e).
89. The federal and state charitable deductions and exemptions are not entirely
parallel. E.g., compare INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 2055(a), with ILt. REv. STAT.
ch. 120, § 401 (1957).
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which arises because of the imposition of the state tax. If a charity
is not burdened in any event by the federal tax, a reduction in such
tax cannot be said to inure solely to its benefit.
However, the federal statute goes on to permit the election to
deduct the state tax if the total federal tax is "equitably appor-
tioned" (in which case some benefit inures to the charity), even
though the special section 2053(d) deduction will also decrease
the tax that noncharitable transferees are required to pay. Con-
sidering this alternative condition of the federal statute, is the tax
"equitably apportioned" under the proposed act when the first
sentence of subsection (e) is taken into account? Probably not,
because the charitable share is entirely unaffected by the deduc-
tion under section 2053(d).
The federal estate tax regulations give an example of the work-
ings of section 2053(d) 90 in which the gross estate is $750,000,
claims and expenses $50,000, and the value of property passing
to the spouse $350,000. The remainder is left in equal shares to
a son and a qualified charity. It is assumed that state inheritance
taxes of $7000, $26,250 and $20,250 are imposed on the interests
of the spouse, son and charity respectively, each payable out of the
legatee's interest, and further that a state apportionment statute
divides the federal tax burden ratably. However, the apportion-
ment rule relieves the spouse of any part of the federal tax burden,
even though the marital deduction is reduced to $343,000 by the
state tax on her interest. Note that this is the rule of the first sen-
tence of subsection (e) of the proposed act. The example con-
tinues:
If the deduction for State death tax on the charitable bequest is allowed
in this case, some portion of the decrease in the federal estate tax
would inure to the benefit of the son, [which precludes the election under
the first test]. The federal estate tax is not considered to be equitably
apportioned in this case since each legatee's share of the Federal estate
tax is not based upon the net amount of his bequest subjected to the
tax (note the surviving spouse is to pay no tax). Inasmuch as some of the
decrease in the Federal estate tax payable would inure to the benefit of
the son, and inasmuch as there is no equitable apportionment of the tax,
no deduction is allowable under section 2053(d).
From this it appears that under the first sentence of subsection
(e) of the proposed act, the section 2053(d) deduction would not
be available to an estate to which the proposed act was applicable,
the necessary conditions to an effective election under section 2053
being precluded. To save this federal deduction for the estate,
the last sentence of subsection (e) was added to the proposed act.
The last sentence provides that if the deduction would be lost to
90. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-9(e) (example 5) (1959).
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the estate by application of subsection (e), subsection (e) will
not apply. In other words, subsection (e) will apply only if there
are no adverse federal tax consequences.
It is one thing to recognize that subsection (e) without the
last sentence would preclude the election under Code section 2053
(d) and another to say whether the remedial sentence is an effec-
tive remedy. Suppose the commissioner asserts a deficiency on the
ground that subsection (e) precludes the deduction for state tax
on a charitable transfer. The statute is drafted in such a way that
the commissioner's victory on the basic issue would not support
the deficiency but would simply invoke the remedial sentence to
render subsection (e) inapplicable. On the other hand, if subsec-
tion (e) is not applicable, then some part of the federal tax would
be apportioned to the charitable bequest and the amount of the
charitable deduction would be reduced by the amount of the fed-
eral tax so apportioned. This leads directly to the complicated
computation of the tax caused by the "mutually dependent vari-
ables" which subsection (e) attempts to avoid. The question then
becomes whether the value of the section 2053(d) deduction ex-
ceeds the burden of the "mutually dependent variable" computa-
tion and the loss of the charitable deduction to the extent of the
federal tax allocated to the charity.
Assuming the last sentence of subsection (e) is retained, a broad-
er question is raised regarding its efficacy to protect the 2053(d)
deduction. Is it, on the one hand, only a "heads I win-ttils you
lose" alternative as to which the federal courts might decline to
make the selection? Or, on the other hand, does it raise only a moot
question under 2053(d) which the courts might refuse to enter-
tain? If viewed as a condition subsequent to the creation of inter-
ests the provision may be ineffective. In a somewhat analogous
gift tax case 91 the court refused to condone "this sort of trifling
with the judicial process,"9 2 since to do so would force the court
to decide an issue which did not present a proper justiciable con-
troversyf 3
Nevertheless, even with some doubt about the efficacy of the
remedial sentence, subsection (e) should be left as is. Its principal
provision will often be operative when no deduction is being
91. Commissioner v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
92. Id. at 827.
93. In Commissioner v. Proctor, 142 F. 2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944), one who made
a gratuitous transfer of a future interest in property purported to attach the con-
dition that the transfer would be nullified and the property would remain his if
the transfer were held subject to the federal gift tax. Among other objections to the
device, the court pointed out that under the provision the court's final judgment in
the tax controversy would be "held for naught because of the provision of an in-




claimed for state tax on charitable transfers. This is sufficiently ad-
vantageous to warrant the risk that it may sometimes preclude the
elective deduction. 4
Subsection (c) of section 5 deals with the effect on apportion-
ment of deductions for property previously taxed and credits for
gift tax paid on a decedent's lifetime transfers and death taxes paid
to a foreign country. The general rule expressed is that the reduc-
tion in tax resulting from such items shall be spread ratably among
all persons subject to apportionment. There are, however, several
defects in this subsection.
It is surprising that the draftsmen did not take into account the
1954 Code change from a deduction for property previously taxed"'
to a credit for property previously taxed." It is quite possible the
courts could bridge this gap by virtue of the general rule expressed
in subsection (a), but the statute should deal expressly with the
effect of a credit for estate tax on prior transfers.
If foreign death taxes or if gift taxes paid by the decedent or his
estate give rise to a credit, it is clear enough that the resulting de-
crease in tax is to be spread ratably among those subject to appor-
tionment. That is, the advantage does not simply inure to the
benefit of the one who is in receipt of the property with respect
to which the tax that gives rise to the credit was imposed."7 But
what if the recipient, himself, of a lifetime gift that is later sub-
jected to estate tax was held liable, as donee,08 for the gift tax
due? It is doubtful whether he can get reimbursement for the
gift tax as such from the decedent's estate.99 Should he not at least
reap the full benefits of the credit that arises from the gift tax that
he paid? The statute does not expressly deal with this situation
although the policy reflected in subsection (d) relating to inheri-
tance tax is in accord with the suggestion being made here. Subsec-'
tion (c) provides a rule only as to gift tax paid by the decedent
or his estate; the following proviso could well be added:
Provided, however, that if any credit for gift taxes arises with respect
to gift tax that has in fact been paid by a person interested in the estate,
such credit shall inure to the benefit of such person.
94. INr. BEv. CODE oF 1954, § 2053(d) is not invariably advantageous and,
even when it should be used, the apparent tax benefit arising out of the deduc-
tion is offset to some extent by a reduction of the credit for state taxes that would
otherwise be allowed. INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1954, § 2011(e).
95. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 812(c), 861(a)(2).
96. INT. RPv. CODE oF 1954, § 2013.
97. It would be clearer that the term "gift taxes" does not refer only to for-
eign gift taxes if the word "for" were inserted before the word "death" in subsec-
tion (c).
98. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(b).
99. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 13 N.J. Super. 596, 81 A.2d 191 (Ch.




Subsection (d) gives to one who pays a state inheritance, suc-
cession, estate or similar tax that results in a credit the advantage
of such credit, ratably along with others who may also pay such
taxes.'
0
Section 6 (No Apportionment Between Temporary and Remain-
der Interests). The provisions of this section have been anticipated
in the discussion of section 5(b). The statutory rule against appor-
tionment within a fund is clear enough. It is based upon the con-
venience in trust administration of paying the tax from principal,
which avoids accounting problems incident to amortization, as well
as on the possible hardship inherent in a requirement of immediate
payment by an income beneficiary. Its fairness, however, is open to
question. Suggestions made earlier in the discussion of section 5(b)
as to how this problem might possibly be dealt with are equally
applicable here.' 0' In this instance, however, the test of practica-
bility of alternative arrangements must be viewed without the con-
sideration, relevant in section 5(b), of simplification of computation
of the charitable and marital deductions for federal estate tax pur-
poses. Thus section 6 is even less open to objection than section 5(b).
Section 7 (Exoneration of Fiduciary). This section sets the scope
of a fiduciary's duty as regards implementation of the apportion-
ment rule. It should be read in conjunction with section 4 under
which the fiduciary's withholding or recovery efforts are framed in
permissive language. Although section 7 is presented negatively, in-
dicating circumstances in which he cannot be held liable, the rea-
sonable implication is that he has a duty, not merely a right, to
effectuate apportionment. 0 2
The first and second sentences of section 7 represent an attempt
to minimize controversy over a fiduciary's liability for failure to
initiate suit. Difficult problems of proof which could arise are
avoided if the statute is construed literally. The first sentence
relieves the fiduciary or other person required to pay the tax of any
duty to initiate suit before the expiration of three months following
the final determination of the tax.10 3 The second sentence reinforces
this by expressly providing against liability if suit is begun season-
100. Provision for the treatment of gift tax paid by the donee could be incorpo-
rated into this subsection instead of into subsection (c).
101. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
102. The statutes of several states make this duty explicit. N.Y. DEcm. EsT.
LAw § 124(5); PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 20, § 885 (Purdon Supp. 1958). In view of
the fiduciaries' responsibility of equal treatment of beneficiaries, it would seem
clear that since the right exists, a duty to pursue it in absence of satisfactory ex-
cuse is also present.
103. The change suggested in the drafting committee's comments to substi-
tute "the payment of the tax" for the "final determination of the tax" seems de-
sirable. Why this change was not incorporated in the final draft was not explained.
Collection efforts should follow promptly after payment; final determination might
take many years if tax liability is litigated.
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ably after the expiration of the three months period, even if the
obligation was collectable some time after the decedent's death but
became uncollectable thereafter.
The section also recognizes that circumstances will arise when col-
lection of a person's share of the tax cannot be made. For example,
if the decedent gave his son $50,000 within three years of death and
in contemplation thereof, the son might squander the gift. If he
receives nothing else from the decedent, he may be entirely judg-
ment proof. The burden of the tax paid must of course be borne by
someone, and section 7 reapportions the son's share of the tax among
the other persons interested in the estate. The statute seems to
require reapportionment in all cases.1"4
The draftsmen deliberately omitted from the last sentence of sec-
tion 7 any language that would give others whose share of the tax
is increased by the son's default a cause of action against the son.
The reason stated is that to do so "would be impracticable and
difficult of enforcement." While the committee seems not to favor
such a cause of action, it clearly exists under any apportionment
statute that does not expressly deny it. The proposed act places the
obligation upon all persons interested in the estate, and section
2205 of the Code makes the resulting rights and obligations enforce-
able as federal rights. Section 2205 provides:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that part
of the estate passing to or in the possession of any person other than the
executor... such person shall be entitled to reimbursement ... by a just
and equitable contribution by the persons . ..whose interest is subject
to equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes....
Does this not give the others a cause of action withaut affirmative
provision in the state statute?
There may be "difficulties of enforcement" but they do not
support the adoption of a rule against eventual justice. On the con-
trary, the other beneficiaries would probably be grateful for, and
have a reasonable claim to, a statutory assist even if their efforts
do face substantial enforcement difficulties. Thinking again in terms
of the illustration above, if the son should strike oil not long after
his default, it is difficult to see why the other persons interested in
the estate should not be able to compel him to make good the added
expense which his default cost them. The following clause should be
added at the end of section 7:
but the fiduciary and each other person shall have the right to recover
from the person in default the amount by which his share of the tax was
increased by such default.
Section 8 (Action by Non-Resident, Reciprocity) Section 8 is
104. Cf. N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A:25-45 (1953); N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAW § 124(5);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 885 (Purdon Supp. 1958).
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intended to meet the problem of enforcing contribution in multi-
state cases and this purpose is laudable. It does, however, contain
provisions that are subject to serious question on policy grounds and
which are also vulnerable to constitutional attack. The section
provides that outside the area of apportionment of the Internal
Revenue Code, a nonresident can sue in the state of enactment on
a claim for contribution only if the state in which the cause of action
originated affords a substantially similar remedy. 0 5 This approach
based on reciprocity is particularly out of place as between states
of the United States in suits involving personal claims and private
litigation. The proposed act is a private law statute and we are not
concerned with reciprocal tax exemptions where one state is grant-
ing a public privilege. In the absence of draftsmen's comments it
may be speculated that this provision was viewed as a prod to
enactment of the proposed act, but, if so, it seems an improper
prod, for it sacrifices uniformity of enforcement. The approach
hardly seems consistent with the objectives of the National Confer-
ences of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The second objection to section 8 is more substantial. Subsection
(b) (1) denies a forum for enforcement of a private right in the
absence of reciprocity. To do so is a violation of the full faith and
credit clause of the federal constitution, as it has long been inter-
preted, whether the suit is on a judgment of the court of a sister
state 1 06 or on a cause of action resting on a statute."0 7
In addition to serious questions of constitutionality under the full
faith and credit clause, the discussion above relating to section 2205
of the Internal Revenue Code and section 7 of the proposed act is
pertinent here.10 8 Subsection 8(b) (2) permits an action to enforce
contribution for federal estate taxes, regardless of reciprocity, if
apportionment is authorized by Congress. The question is whether
subsection 8(b) (2) purports to authorize such suits only with re-
spect to apportionment under sections 2206 and 2207, relating to
life insurance and power of appointment property, or whether
it also embraces the federal recognition of state apportionment rules
under section 2205.109 The supremacy clause of the federal consti-
tution would preclude the denial of a forum for a suit to enforce
105. An alternative right exists with respect to apportionment "authorized by
Congress." UNFomR EsTATE TAx Amrowno EnT Act § 8(b)(2).
106. Milwaukee County v. M. E. VThite Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935); Kenney v.
Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920).
107. First Natl Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
108. See text at notes 30-32, and 102-104 supra.
109. Technically § 8(a) gives a remedy in some cases to a "fiduciary" where
one would not exist under the exception relating to executors in LvTr. REv. CoDE Or
1954, § 2205. See note 80 supra. This factor has little bearing however on the
question of the interrelation of state and federal law here being raised.
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contribution based on state law made enforceable as a matter of
federal right under section 2205. In this light it seems likely the
courts would adopt the broader interpretation of section 8 under
which the statute can be sustained.
Nevertheless, these questionable matters in iection 8 and the rel-
ative unimportance of its restrictive provisions, if they are inter-
preted in such a way as to escape constitutional attack, suggest that
all of subsection (b) and the related introductory clause of subsec-
tion (a) should be deleted.
III. CONCLUSIOr
The need for nationwide uniformity of approach to the question
of the ultimate impact of both federal and state estate taxes will
probably continue to grow rather than diminish. A preferable first
step toward uniformity would be a federal statute apportioning the
federal estate tax. A federal statute is appropriate even though ap-
portionment goes beyond tax determination and collection because
it would help to reduce the private litigation and interstate conflicts
which are occasioned by the federal tax. The federal government
should not be blind to the disturbing effect of tax legislation, beyond
the direct financial consequences, upon individuals and states. Con-
gress has an obligation to alleviate, as far as it is able, the incon-
venience and hardship incident to the imposition of a federal law.
Here the single tax levied upon assets often located in and going to
persons located in several state jurisdictions creates problems that
are not easily susceptible of state solution and of which Congress
should take heed.110
In view of the failure of Congress to act, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is to be commended for
attacking the complex problem of apportionment. Acknowledging
that it may be a late date at which to question the proposed Uniform
Estate Tax Apportionment Act, our conclusion is nevertheless that
the proposed act does not supply an adequate answer to the need
for a uniform state approach to the apportionment problem."' If the
objections raised to the act in this article are sound, some states
may reject it outright, defeating its law reform purpose, and diverse
110. Further, the Internal Revenue Service should not shirk its responsibility
to come forward with proposals for legislation in this area.
111. This conclusion seems borne out by other recent studies of the problem.
See particularly Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WAS!T.
U.L.Q. 327. Powell's article does not refer to the proposed act, probably because
prepared at a date prior to its approval, but contains much which is pertinent to
an evaluation of this act. Even if one rejects Powell's preference on a broad policy
level for a statute that apportions the tax only against nonprobate assets, the pro-
posed act would make a rather poor showing under his exhaustive analysis and
proposed test for good state apportionment statutes. Id. at 345.
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modifications of the act by enacting states may frustrate the objec-
tive of the Conference to achieve uniformity. Early re-examination
and revision may avoid both these eventualities. Meanwhile, ap-
proval of the proposed act by the National Conference and by the
American Bar Association helps to focus attention on the need for
a uniform approach to the apportionment problem. If such action
should spur Congress to enact comprehensive legislation appropri-
ately dealing with the apportionment of the federal estate tax, the
very considerable effort that has gone into the proposed act will
not have been in vain. Moreover, it might be hoped and perhaps
expected that such federal legislation would be adopted as a model
for state legislation further attacking the vexing problem of appor-
tionment of state death taxes.
In any event, as all informed attorneys know, no legislation in this
area will ever eliminate the need to consider with respect to each
transfer or proposed transfer of property the way in which the ulti-
mate estate tax burden should fall. Further consideration of pro-
posed apportionment legislation may help to drive home this matter
to some who have not in the past had an adequate awareness of its
significance.
APPENDIX
UNimoiu ESTATE TAx APPoRTIoNmNT AcT
SECMON 1. [Definitions.] In this Act
(a) "Estate" means the gross estate of a decedent as determined
for the purpose of Federal estate tax [and the estate tax payable to
this state] [and the death duty payable by a decedent's estate to
this state].
(b) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association,
joint stock company, corporation, government, political subdivi-
sion, governmental agency, or local governmental agency.
(c) "Person interested in the estate" means any person entitled
to receive, or who has received, from a decedent or by reason of
the death of a decedent any property or interest therein included
in the decedents estate. It includes a personal representative,
guardian, and trustee.
(d) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
(e) "Tax" means the Federal estate tax [and the estate tax
payable to this state] [and the death duty payable by a decedents




(f) "Fiduciary" means executor, administrator or (sic] any de-
scription, and trustee.
SETION 2. [Apportionment.] Unless the will otherwise provides,
the tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in the
estate. The apportionment shall be made in the proportion that the
value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears to
the total value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate.
The values used in determining the tax shall be used for that purpose.
SECTON 8. [Procedure for Determining Apportionment.]
(a) The [Probate Court] having jurisdiction over the adminis-
tration of the estate of a decedent shall determine the apportion-
ment of the tax. If there are no probate proceedings, the [Probate
Court] of the [county] wherein the decedent was domiciled at
death upon the application of the person required to pay the tax
shall determine the apportionment of the tax.
(b) If the [Probate Court] finds that it is inequitable to appor-
tion interest and penalties in the manner provided in Section 2,
because of special circumstances, it may direct apportionment
thereof in the manner it finds equitable.
(c) If the [Probate Court] finds that the assessment of penal-
ties and interest assessed in relation to the tax is due to delay
caused by the negligence of the fiduciary, the court may charge
the fiduciary with the amount of the assessed penalties and in-
terest.
(d) In any suit or judicial proceeding to recover from any ser-
son interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to
the person in accordance with this Act, the determination of the
[Probate Court] in respect thereto shall be prima facie correct.
SECTON 4. [Method of Proration.]
(a) The fiduciary or other person in possession of the property
of the decedent required to pay the tax may withhold from any
property distributable to any person interested in the estate, upon
its distribution to him, the amount of tax attributable to his inter-
est. If the property in possession of the fiduciary or other person
required to pay the tax and distributable to any person interested
in the estate is insufficient to satisfy the proportionate amount of
the tax determined to be due from the person, the fiduciary or
other person required to pay the tax may recover the deficiency
from the person interested in the estate. If the property is not
in the possession of the fiduciary or other person required to pay
the tax, the fiduciary or the other person required to pay the tax
may recover from any person interested in the estate the amount
of the tax apportioned to the person in accordance with this Act.
(b) If property held by the fiduciary is distributed prior to final
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apportionment of the tax, the distributee shall provide a bond or
other security for the apportionment liability in the form and
amount prescribed by the fiduciary, with the approval of the [Pro-
bate Court] having jurisdiction of the administration of the estate.
SECTION 5. [Allowance for Exemptions, Deductions and Credits.]
(a) In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made for
any exemptions granted, [any classification made of persons inter-
ested in the estate] and for any deductions and credits allowed by
the law imposing the tax.
(b) Any exemption or deduction allowed by reason of the re-
lationship of any person to the decedent or by reason of the pur-
poses of the gift shall inure to the benefit of the person bearing
such relationship or receiving the gift; except that when an interest
is subject to a prior present interest which is not allowable as a
deduction, the tax apportionable against the present interest shall
be paid from principal.
(c) Any deduction for property previously taxed and any
credit for gift taxes or death taxes of a foreign country paid by
the decedent or his estate shall inure to the proportionate benefit
of all persons liable to apportionment.
(d) Any credit for inheritance, succession or estate taxes or
taxes in the nature thereof in respect to property or interests in-
cludable in the estate shall inure to the benefit of the persons or
interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent that,
or in proportion as the credit reduces the tax.
(e) To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a
surviving spouse or any charitable, public, or similar gift or be-
quest does not constitute an allowable deduction for purposes of
the tax solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax
imposed upon and deductible from the property, the property shall
not be included in the computation provided for in Section 2 here-
of, and to that extent no apportionment shall be made against the
property. The sentence immediately preceding shall not apply to
any case where the result will be to deprive the estate of a deduc-
tion otherwise allowable under Section 2058(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 of the United States, relating to deduction
for State death taxes on transfers for public, charitable or religious
uses.
SECTON 6. [No Apportionment between Temporary and Re-
mainder Interests.] No interest in income and no estate for years
or for life or other temporary interest in any property or fund shall
be subject to apportionment as between the temporary interest and
the remainder. The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if
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any, on the remainder shall be chargeable against the corpus of the
property or funds subject to the temporary interest and remainder.
S.ECToN 7. [Exoneration of Fiduciary.] Neither the fiduciary
nor other person required to pay the tax shall be under any duty
to institute any suit or proceeding to recover from any person
interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the
person until the expiration of the [three months] next following
final determination of the tax. A fiduciary or other person re-
quired to pay the tax who institutes the suit or proceeding within
[a reasonable time] after [the three months' period] shall not be
subject to any liability or surcharge because any portion of the tax
apportioned to any person interested in the estate was collectable
*at a time following the death of the decedent but thereafter be-
came uncollectable. If the fiduciary or other person required to
pay the tax cannot collect from any person interested in the estate
the amount of the tax apportioned to the person, the amount not
recoverable shall be equitably apportioned among the other per-
sons interested in the estate, who are subject to apportionment.
SECTION 8. [Action by Non-Resident, Reciprocity.
(a) Subject to the conditions in subsection (b) of this section
a fiduciary acting in another state or a person required to pay the
tax [domiciled] resident] in another state may institute an action
in the courts of this state and may recover a proportionate amount
of the federal estate tax, of an estate tax payable to another state
or of a death duty due by a decedent's estate to another state,
from a person interested in the estate who is either [domiciled]
[resident] in this state or who owns property in this state subject to
attachment or execution. For the purposes of the action the deter-
mination of apportionment by the court having jurisdiction of the
administration of the decedent's estate in the other state shall be
prima facie correct.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall apply
only:
(1) If such other state affords a remedy substantially similar
to that afforded in subsection (a) hereof;
(2) With respect to Federal estate tax, if apportionment
thereof is authorized by Congress.
SECTION 9. [Uniformity of Interpretation.] This act shall be
so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 10. [Short Title.] This act may be cited as the Uni-
form Estate Tax Apportionment Act.
SECTION 11. [Severability.] If any provision of this act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
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the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of
the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.





SEnON 18. [Time of Application of Act.] This act shall not
apply to taxes due on account of the death of decedents dying prior
to [six months after the enactment of this act.]

